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Small Gifts and Big Trouble:
Clarifying the Taft-Hartley Act
By JAMES ACHERMANN*
Introduction
SECTION 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”),
commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Act and codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 186 (collectively “Section 186”),1 prohibits employers and their
agents from issuing bribes, bestowing gifts, and engaging in conflict of
interest payments to employees, union officials, and labor organiza-
tions.2 While the statute attempts to curb potential dishonesty and un-
fair influence within the management/union relationship, its
provisions are overly expansive and vague.3 The plain language of the
statute is extremely broad, using convoluted and ambiguous terminol-
ogy. However, because the criminal penalties for violating Section 186
are severe, it is important to have a working knowledge of how courts
have interpreted it. Criminal penalties are applied in two forms: (1)
for transactions which involve a “thing of value” exceeding $1000, the
penalty is imprisonment for five years and a fine for each violation;
and (2) for transactions in which the “thing of value” is $1000 or less,
the penalty is imprisonment for one year and a fine.4 This Article il-
luminates the statute’s general terms by using legal precedent and
analysis.
* James Achermann received his J.D. from the University of San Francisco School of
Law after obtaining a B.A. in Political Science and History from the University of
California, at Davis. Currently he is a practicing attorney who specializes in employment
and labor law. He would like to thank both of his parents, Bob and Joan Achermann, for
their love and support. He would also like to thank Ken Absalom and Ed Nevin for their
mentorship, as well as the University of San Francisco and the USF Law Review for the gift
of knowledge and assistance with this Article.
1. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Criminal Resource Manual 2413 Outline of 29 U.S.C. § 186 (Taft
Hartley Act § 302), http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/
crm02413.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2009).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 186 (2006).
3. United Steelworkers v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 492 F.2d 713, 732 (5th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Lanni, 466 F.2d 1102, 1103–05 (3d Cir. 1972).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 186(d) (2006).
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The statute is separated into three subsections. Section 186(a)
prohibits employers or those acting in the interest of employers from
making any payments or loans of “any thing of value” to labor unions
or their representatives. Further, subsection (a) prohibits employer
payments that would constitute a bribe or that are aimed either di-
rectly or indirectly at forming committees to influence employee or-
ganization or collective bargaining.5 Section 186(b) creates
synonymous liability to subsection (a) in the payee that accepts, re-
quests, demands, receives, or agrees to receive any prohibited “thing
of value” as described in subsection (a).6 Section 186(c) lists nine spe-
5. 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) (2006) states:
(a) Payment or lending, etc., of money by employer or agent to employees, repre-
sentatives, or labor organizations
It shall be unlawful for any employer or association of employers or any person
who acts as a labor relations expert, adviser, or consultant to an employer or who
acts in the interest of an employer to pay, lend, or deliver, or agree to pay, lend,
or deliver, any money or other thing of value—
(1) to any representative of any of his employees who are employed in
an industry affecting commerce; or
(2) to any labor organization, or any officer or employee thereof, which
represents, seeks to represent, or would admit to membership, any of the
employees of such employer who are employed in an industry affecting com-
merce; or
(3) to any employee or group or committee of employees of such em-
ployer employed in an industry affecting commerce in excess of their normal
compensation for the purpose of causing such employee or group or commit-
tee directly or indirectly to influence any other employees in the exercise of
the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing; or
(4) to any officer or employee of a labor organization engaged in an
industry affecting commerce with intent to influence him in respect to any of
his actions, decisions, or duties as a representative of employees or as such
officer or employee of such labor organization.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 186(b) (2006) states:
(b) Request, demand, etc., for money or other thing of value
(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to request, demand, receive, or
accept, or agree to receive or accept, any payment, loan, or delivery of any
money or other thing of value prohibited by subsection (a) of this section.
(2) It shall be unlawful for any labor organization, or for any person
acting as an officer, agent, representative, or employee of such labor organi-
zation, to demand or accept from the operator of any motor vehicle (as de-
fined in section 13102 of Title 49) employed in the transportation of
property in commerce, or the employer of any such operator, any money or
other thing of value payable to such organization or to an officer, agent,
representative or employee thereof as a fee or charge for the unloading, or
in connection with the unloading, of the cargo of such vehicle: Provided, That
nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to make unlawful any payment
by an employer to any of his employees as compensation for their services as
employees.
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cific exceptions to the broad prohibitions contained within subsection
(a) and (b).7 This Article first examines the exceptions provided in
subsection (c), and then endeavors to clarify subsections (b) and (a)
in turn.
I. Exceptions Identified in Section 186(c)
This Article focuses only on those exceptions that would be of
greatest importance to union officials and members. They are as
follows:
3. with respect to the sale or purchase of an article or commodity
at the prevailing market price in the regular course of
business . . . ;
4. with respect to money deducted from the wages of employees in
payment of membership dues in a labor organization: Provided,
[t]hat the employer has . . . a written assignment . . . ;
5. with respect to money or other thing of value paid to a trust
fund established by such representative, for the sole and exclu-
sive benefit of the employees, and their families and dependents
. . . for medical or hospital care, pensions on retirement or
death of employees, compensation for injuries or illness result-
ing from occupational activity or insurance to provide any of the
foregoing, or unemployment benefits or life insurance, disabil-
ity and sickness insurance, or accident insurance . . . ;
6. with respect to money or other thing of value paid by any em-
ployer to a trust fund established by such representative for the
purpose of pooled vacation, holiday, severance or similar bene-
fits, or defraying costs of apprenticeship or other training
programs . . . ;
7. with respect to money or other thing of value paid by any em-
ployer to a pooled or individual trust fund established by such
representative for . . . scholarships for the benefit of employees,
their families, and dependents . . . child care centers . . . or
financial assistance for employee housing . . . ;
8. with respect to money or other thing of value paid by any em-
ployer to a trust fund established . . . for the purpose of de-
fraying the costs of legal services.8
A. Section 186(c)(3): Sale or Purchase of an Item at the Prevailing
Market Price in the Regular Course of Business
Section 186(c)(3) allows payments made for the sale or purchase
of an item at the prevailing market price in the regular course of busi-
ness.9 In United States v. Carlock,10 the payment in question was rent
7. See 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (2006).
8. Id. § 186(c)(3)–(8).
9. Id. § 186(c)(3).
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paid by the employer to the union for the use of a bulldozer. The
court debated whether the exception applied to rental property. The
trial court, however, declined to answer this question. Rather, the
court found that the rent paid by the employer was far above the mar-
ket price and actually reflected a price more akin to that of a new
bulldozer.11 The court concluded that the exception did not apply
under these egregious circumstances.12
In United States v. Pecora,13 a testimonial dinner was held to honor
the defendant, a union business manager, for his involvement in the
labor movement. Several employers of the defendant’s union mem-
bers purchased over $25,000 in tickets and advertising. After expenses
were paid for the dinner, the defendant received the excess profits in
cash. In holding that the payments violated Section 186, the Third
Circuit found the exception in subsection (c)(3) did not apply.14 Spe-
cifically, the court noted:
Even if we were to assume that a testimonial dinner was a “com-
modity,” and even if we were to assume that it was sold in “the
regular course of business,” it would strain credulity to believe that
the market price for an advertisement in the program was $300 or
that the value of the dinner was twenty-five dollars per person. The
fact that out of gross proceeds of $44,400 the expenses of the din-
ner amounted only to $11,871.72 belies a conclusion that the testi-
monial was offered at the market price.15
These examples highlight the ways in which courts narrowly inter-
pret this exception and emphasize “true market value” in determining
whether the exception applies. For example, the fact that the employ-
ers in Pecora purchased tickets was not in and of itself the problem.
Rather, Section 186 proscribed the quantity of tickets purchased at
such an excessive price. Similarly, the rent paid on the bulldozer in
Carlock was well above the market rate. Thus, Section 186(c)(3) is only
applicable if one is truly making the purchase or sale within the regu-
lar scope of business, and the price does not deviate from the prevail-
ing market price.
10. 806 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1986).
11. Id. at 543–44.
12. Id. at 545–46.
13. 484 F.2d 1289 (3d Cir. 1973).
14. Id. at 1294.
15. Id.
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B. Section 186(c)(4): Dues Deductions
Section 186(c)(4) allows an employer to deduct union dues di-
rectly from an employee’s pay.16 To fall within this exception, an em-
ployer must receive a written assignment from each employee for all
dues deducted.17 Further, the authorization cannot be irrevocable for
a period of more than one year, or beyond the termination date of the
applicable collective agreement, whichever occurs first.18 The Ninth
Circuit has noted “[t]he dues check-off procedure of [Section
186(c)(4)] is designed to ensure not only the ‘protection of the em-
ployee’ but also administrative convenience in the collection of
dues.”19
Despite the one-year limitation set out under Section 186(c)(4),
the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) will not prosecute employers who
automatically renew these authorizations so long as the employer pro-
vides an annual “escape period.”20 Further, the DOJ will not prosecute
for authorized deductions for payment of initiation fees and assess-
ments, giving a broad interpretation of the statutory term “member-
ship fees.”21 The term “membership fees” includes both “service fees”
assessed against non-member employees,22 as well as “supplemental
dues.”23 While an employee may revoke an authorization at will dur-
ing the time between collective bargaining agreements,24 an at-
tempted revocation during a valid collective bargaining agreement—
but outside the aforementioned escape period—will be ineffective.
However, the mere fact that a check-off arrangement has been labeled
as “membership dues” within a collective bargaining agreement does
not ensure that it will be safe from Section 186 prosecution. Courts
16. 28 U.S.C. § 186(c)(4) (2006).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Associated Builders & Contractors v. Carpenters Vacation & Holiday Trust Fund,
700 F.2d 1269, 1277 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing NLRB v. Atlanta Printing Specialties and Paper
Prods. Union 527, 523 F.2d 783, 786 (5th Cir. 1975)).
20. JOHN E. HIGGINS JR., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 2177 (5th ed. 2006) (citations omitted); see also Ma-
chinists Monroe Lodge 770 v. Litton Bus. Sys., 334 F. Supp. 310 (W.D. Va. 1971).
21. HIGGINS, supra note 20, at 2177 (citations omitted). R
22. Id. at 2178 (citing Grajczyk v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 210 F. Supp. 702 (S.D. Cal.
1962)).
23. Schwartz v. Associated Musicians, Local 802, 340 F.2d 228, 233 (2d Cir. 1964).
24. HIGGINS, supra note 20, at 2178 (citing United Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers v. R
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 345 F. Supp. 274 (W.D. Pa. 1972), aff’d mem., 478 F.2d 1399 (3d
Cir. 1973)).
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will look to the purpose of the fee, not the name or manner in which
it was collected, to judge its character.25
C. Section 186(c)(5)–(8): Payments to Trusts
Section 186(c)(5) allows payments by the employer to trust funds
established “for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees of
such employer, and their families and dependents.”26 In order for the
exception to apply, the four requirements within subsection (c)(5)(B)
must be met. First, the detailed basis on which such payments are
made must be specified in a written agreement with the employer.27
Second, employees and employers must be equally represented in the
administration of such a fund.28 Third, in the event the employer and
employee groups deadlock on the administration of such fund, and
there are no neutral persons empowered to break such deadlock, the
trust agreement provides that the two groups shall agree contractually
on an impartial umpire to decide such dispute.29 Fourth, the trust
agreement calls for an annual audit of the trust fund, a statement of
the results of which shall be available for inspection by interested per-
sons at the principal office of the trust fund and at such other places
as may be designated in such written agreement.30
Under the exception set forth in Section 186(c)(5), any payments
to the trust fund must be made for the benefit of employees. Making
payments on behalf of independent contractors would not fall within
25. Master Insulators v. Int’l Ass’n of Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers,
Local No.1, 925 F.2d 1118 (8th Cir. 1991); see also Detroit Mailers Union No. 40, 192 NLRB
951 (1971).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (2006).
27. Compare Thurber v. W. Conference of Teamsters Pension Plan, 542 F.2d 1106,
1109 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that written authorization is required), and Moglia v. Ge-
oghegan, 403 F.2d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 1968) (same), with Brown v. C. Volante Corp., 194
F.3d 351 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that employer’s signature is not necessary on agreement
when employer contributes funds based on the agreement), and Nat’l Leadburners Health
& Welfare Fund v. O.G. Kelly & Co., 129 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 1997) (same).
28. NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 330 (1981); see also Culinary and Serv.
Employees Union, Local 555 v. Haw. Employee Benefit Admin. Inc., 688 F.2d 1228 (9th
Cir. 1982) (finding that with funds that cover multiple employers or unions, each individ-
ual employer or union is entitled only to the total number of employer trustees that equal
the total number of union trustees, not equal representation).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B) (2006) (providing that if the parties are unable to come
to agreement on an impartial umpire within a reasonable amount of time, upon petition
by either party, a district court of the United States for the district in which the trust has its
principle office will appoint an impartial umpire).
30. Id. § 186(c)(5).
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the exception.31 However, an agreement by which non-employee
hours were used to formulate the total amount an employer had to
pay into a fund could fall within the exception.32
In nominating and selecting trustees, both the union and em-
ployer must be careful in how selections are made so as not to violate
the equal representation requirement of Section 186(c)(5)(B).33
Equal care must be shown in establishing removal procedures for
trustees. Any trustee who may not be removed “at will” could arguably
violate the equal representation requirement.34 Funds that institute
the four requirements would be exempt from Section 186.
The exceptions under Section 186(c)(6)–(8) allow employer pay-
ments to trust funds established for the following purposes: “pooled
vacation, holiday, severance or similar benefits, or defraying costs of
apprenticeship or other training programs[;]” “scholarships for the
benefit of employees, their families, and dependents . . . child care
centers . . . or financial assistance for employee housing[;]” and “de-
fraying the costs of legal services.”35 All three exceptions must con-
form to the trust requirements in Section 186(c)(5) in order to fall
within the overall exception.
The nine exceptions correspond to some of the more basic and
necessary components of many union/employer relationships, includ-
ing membership fees and trust funds. However, the scope of the ex-
ceptions in Section 186 is extremely narrow and union/employer
transaction will likely fall within the statute’s general prohibition.
31. Labor Relations Divs. of Constr. Indus. v. Teamsters Local 379, 156 F.3d 13, 19–21
(1st Cir. 1998) (defining the term “employee” under Section 186).
32. See Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401 (1977) (finding that if a clause in the agree-
ment between a union and contractors required the contractor to pay contributions to
trust funds, and the amount of those contributions was measured by the hours of work
performed on the project by employees of nonsignatory subcontractors with the benefits
payable only to workers employed by signatory employers, the provision would fall within
exception to the general Taft-Hartley Act); see also Todd v. Benal Concrete Constr. Co., 710
F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding that the Labor Management Relations Act barred trust
fund payments on behalf of owner-operators who were, in reality, independent contractors
under the common law agency test, notwithstanding a provision of the collective bargain-
ing agreement requiring employer contributions to trusts on behalf of those individuals).
33. Quad City Builders Ass’n v. Bricklayers Union No. 7, 431 F.2d 999 (8th Cir. 1970)
(“Any plan as a minimum requirement should be so designed that active Union members,
who at times serve as employees, do not have a dominant voice in the election of manage-
ment trustees.”).
34. Teamsters Local No. 145 v. Kuba, 631 F. Supp. 1063, 1071 (D. Conn. 1986) (hold-
ing that “a provision of the trust agreement requiring ‘proper and just cause’ for the re-
moval of a trustee violate[d] Section 302(c)(5) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5), and
[was] therefore unenforceable”).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(6)–(8) (2006).
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Therefore, a step-by-step breakdown of the crucial statutory terms will
help rein in the enormous breadth of the statute.
II. Jurisdictional Standards for Section 186(a)-(b)
Section 186 imposes criminal penalties for those violations that
affect interstate commerce.36 The term “affecting commerce” is de-
fined as “in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the
free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor
dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of com-
merce.”37 This jurisdictional standard has been applied in a broad
manner under which most industries would fall within its scope. In
Sheet Metal Contractors Ass’n v. Sheet Metal Workers International Ass’n,38
the Ninth Circuit assessed the interstate commerce jurisdictional re-
quirement and declared that there was no need to consider how
much interstate business an employer may do. The Ninth Circuit
noted the purpose of the statute was to “prevent employers from tam-
pering with the loyalty of union officials, and disloyal union officials
from levying tribute upon employers.”39 Thus, the court found that an
employee need only establish a violation by an employer and an em-
ployee representative to impose liability for criminal penalties on an
employer.40
In United States v. Ricciardi,41 the Second Circuit laid out a frame-
work for assessing Section 186 claims. The first step in assessing the
jurisdictional question was to identify the relevant industry being af-
fected.42 The court went on to write, “the relevant industry for the
purposes of 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(1) and (b)(1) comprises all business
activities in the same field as the business activities of employers whose
employees were represented by the recipients of the allegedly unlaw-
36. Id. § 186(a), (d).
37. Id. § 152(7).
38. 248 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1957).
39. Id. at 311 (quoting United States v. Ryan, 225 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 1955)).
40. The court noted:
We cannot believe that in an attempt to accomplish this objective Congress in-
tended to provide that the levying of tribute should be prohibited only where the
employers were large ones whose volume of interstate business was substantial,
but that the unions had full liberty to levy tribute upon the smaller employers
within the same industry, even though the union officials represented employees
who are employed in an industry which, as such, affected commerce.
Id.
41. 357 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1966).
42. Id. at 94–97.
\\server05\productn\S\SAN\44-1\SAN103.txt unknown Seq: 9 13-OCT-09 13:29
Summer 2009] CLARIFYING THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT 71
ful payments.”43 The standard laid out in Ricciardi creates an expan-
sive jurisdictional net for Section 186. The inquiry as to whether the
violation affects commerce is not limited to the literal employee repre-
sentative and employer within the matter, but rather extends to all
business activities in the same field. Thus, it is almost impossible to
imagine a situation that would not meet the Section 186 jurisdictional
standard. In fact, the indictment need not even contain an allegation
of which industry is affected or how the violation actually affects
commerce.44
III. Constitutionality
Challenges to the constitutionality of Section 186 have proven un-
successful. Attacks have come in a variety of forms—including the
First Amendment’s protection of religious freedom.45 However, the
majority of the attacks have alleged that Section 186 is void for its
vague language. Repeatedly, courts have held that the language of the
statute is sufficient, and that a reasonable person would know if his or
her conduct is prohibited.46 The terms “any representative of any of
his employees,”47 and “any payment”48 have both been unsuccessfully
challenged on a basis of vagueness.
In United States v. Sink,49 the defendant union leader contended
that the term “would admit to membership” was vague in that it made
conduct criminal that had not yet occurred. The court stated the stat-
ute “prohibited, with certain exceptions, payments by an employer to
43. Id. at 95.
44. United States v. Di Salvo, 251 F. Supp. 740, 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (citing Ricciardi,
357 F.2d at 91).
45. See United States v. Thompson, 466 F. Supp. 18 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (defendant who
received a Christmas card that contained $900 in cash from an officer of the company
argued that the act was protected by the First Amendment. However, the court found this
argument unconvincing, as the cash was paid from company funds and sent by an officer.),
aff’d mem, 588 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978).
46. See United States v. Ryan, 128 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y 1995) (citing United States v.
Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954)), rev’d on other grounds, 225 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1955).
47. Id. at 134–35 (finding that the term “any representative of any of his employees”
of Section 186 was sufficient to inform a reasonable person as to whether or not they would
fall within the statute’s reach); Di Salvo, 251 F. Supp. at 740 (stating that the congressional
expansion of Section 186 to expressly include loans post Ryan, does not render it constitu-
tionally vague); see also Harriss, 347 U.S. at 612 (finding that if the statute is plainly directed
to a general class of cases, it will not be struck down as vague even though marginal cases
pose questions of doubt).
48. United States v. Lanni, 466 F.2d 1102, 1109 (3d Cir. 1972) (“The statute’s broad
prohibition of ‘all payments’ gave the appellants fair notice that indirect payments were
included.”).
49. 355 F. Supp. 1067 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff’d mem., 485 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1973).
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the labor union representatives of the employer’s labor force.”50 In
addition, the court found “[t]he statute recognized a similar, and pos-
sibly greater danger, in comparable situations where the laborers
would be unionized in the future.”51 As such, “the statute prohibited
payments by employers to labor union representatives of unions that
‘would admit to membership, any employees of such employer.’”52
Furthermore, the instructions given to the jury at trial stated “the de-
fendant could not be found guilty unless (1) the local union of which
the defendant was president would admit to membership any of the
employees of MacClean Service Company, Inc. [the employer]; and
(2) the defendant knew that such employees would be admitted to
membership.”53 The court also advised the jury that the phrase
“would admit to membership” meant “a present intention of the em-
ployees to apply for union membership or a present intention of Mac-
Clean Service Company to come into the Philadelphia area and
employ laborers who would and could be admitted to the local
union.”54 The court disagreed that the term was vague.
At least two courts have since disagreed with the Sink court’s “pre-
sent sense” interpretation of “would admit into membership.”55 Yet, it
is worth noting that the court’s approach only side-stepped the consti-
tutional vagueness challenge by relying on present-intent jury instruc-
tions. If courts continue to discredit Sink’s present-intent standard, it
may leave Section 186 vulnerable to further vagueness challenges.
IV. Scienter/Criminal Intent
Section 186(d) sets out the criminal penalties associated with the
Act, as well as the requisite intent or scienter that must be established
for conviction.56 Section 186(d)(1) details the circumstances that re-
quire a higher level of scienter. Under this elevated standard, a par-
ticipant of the transaction must act willfully with the knowledge of the
transaction and with an intent to benefit himself or to benefit other
persons he knows are not permitted to receive a payment, loan,
money, or other thing of value under Section 186(c)(4)–(c)(9). The
higher element of scienter is imposed to safeguard against inadvertent
50. Id. at 1070.
51. Id.
52. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(2) (2006)).
53. Id. at 1070.
54. Id. at 1070–71.
55. See United States v. Pecora, 798 F.2d 614, 622 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v.
Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1251–52 (11th Cir. 2007).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 186(d) (2006).
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violations of the statute, such as when payments are made to improp-
erly structured benefit trusts.57
The more relevant intent requirement under Section 186(d)(2)
covers all other prohibited transactions. Section 186(d)(2) only re-
quires that the participant in the prohibited transaction act willingly.58
In United States v. Phillips,59 the Eleventh Circuit broke down Section
186 and gave strong support for the contention that Section
186(d)(2) requires only that the payments were made willingly with
no further criminal intent. The court points out that subsections
(a)(1) and (a)(2) prohibit “any payment,”60 while subsections (a)(3)
and (a)(4) state the requisite intent as “intent to influence.”61 There-
fore, the court reasoned:
Congress must have intended sections 186(a)(1)–(2) to prohibit
payments to representatives even if they were made without any
intent to influence. Any other interpretation would render the re-
quirement of “an intent to influence” in sections 186(a)(3) and
(a)(4) mere surplusage. Under appellants’ interpretation of “will-
fully” in section 186(d), sections 186(a)(1) and (a)(2) would serve
only to prohibit payments made to employee representatives with-
out any intent to influence but with the specific intent to violate
the law. We cannot agree with such a nonsensical result; the statu-
tory scheme is coherent and rational when “willfully” is interpreted
as requiring only general intent.62
There is no requirement that the plaintiff prove that the defen-
dant acted with knowledge of the statutory prohibition in order to
find a violation of Section 186. Rather, the plaintiff need only prove
that the defendant acted willfully.63
57. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Criminal Resource Manual, 2413 Outline of 29 U.S.C. 186, in U.S.
ATT’Y MANUALS, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm
02413.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2009); see also United States v. Papis, 910 F.2d 1357, 1363
(7th Cir. 1990):
The reasonable conclusion is that Congress meant to add an additional element
for certain payments in § 186(d)(1) that would not apply to other payments. The
legislative history fortifies this conclusion: for payments under § 186(d)(2), “the
committee determined not to include a specific mens rea requirement for prosecu-
tions under (d)(2). The mens rea requirement for prosecutions under (d)(2) will
continue to be ‘willfully.’”
Id. (citations omitted).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 186(d)(2) (2006).
59. 19 F.3d 1565 (11th Cir. 1994).
60. Id. at 1580 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(1)–(2) (2006)).
61. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(3)–(4) (2006)).
62. Id. at 1580–81.
63. United States v. Cody, 722 F.2d 1052, 1059 (2d Cir. 1983) (requiring proof only
that defendant “received and knew that he was receiving a benefit of value”); United States
v. Bloch, 696 F.2d 1213, 1216 (9th Cir. 1982) (“A ‘willful’ violation of 29 U.S.C. § 186
requires only that the defendant act with knowledge that the payments are from a person
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V. Employer
Section 186 prohibits gifts from “any employer or association of
employers or any person who acts as a labor relations expert, adviser,
or consultant to an employer or who acts in the interest of an em-
ployer.”64 In United States v. Donavan,65 the court held that in an in-
dictment based on Section 186, the charges levied against the accused
must be pled with particularity. A generic charge will therefore not
suffice, and any charge against an employer under the statute must be
precise to be upheld under the Sixth Amendment.66 Thus, the plead-
ings cannot state, in general terms, that an employer defendant has
violated Section 186. For example, in identifying an employer, the
pleadings must state whether the employer is an individual employer,
an association of employers, a person acting as a labor relations ex-
pert, adviser, or consultant to an employer, or a person acting in the
interest of an employer.
For the purposes of Section 186, the term “employer” includes
any person acting as an agent of an employer directly or indirectly.67
Courts have relied upon precedent to define what constitutes an em-
ployer for purposes of Section 186. As such, the term employer has
been interpreted as “anyone who owns, or who engages in operating,
for himself, a business having employees . . . .”68 Additionally, courts
have used Section 186 to prohibit any payments made by an employer
through a non-employer private corporation, implicitly extending the
definition of employer over these corporations.69
acting in the interest of an employer. . . . [K]nowledge of the statutory prohibition itself is
not necessary.”); United States v. Pecora, 484 F.2d 1289, 1294 (3d Cir. 1973) (requiring
knowledge only “(1) that there were ‘payments’; and (2) that the payments came from
employers who employed workers represented by [defendant]”); United States v. Carter,
311 F.2d 934, 943 (6th Cir. 1963) (quoting Judge Learned Hand for the proposition that
“the word ‘willful,’ even in criminal statutes, means no more than that the person charged
with the duty knows what he is doing. It does not mean that, in addition, he must suppose
that he is breaking the law.”); see also United States v. Silva, 517 F. Supp. 727, 735 (D. R.I.
1980) (“The word ‘willfully’ means that the person knowingly and intentionally committed
the acts which constituted the offenses charged. . . . The word does not require, as a part of
its meaning, that there be any knowledge or awareness that such act or omission is in fact
prohibited by law.”).
64. 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) (2006).
65. 339 F.2d 404 (7th Cir. 1964).
66. Id. at 407–08.
67. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006).
68. NLRB v. New Madrid Mfg. Co., 215 F.2d 908 (8th Cir. 1954); see also Hotel Em-
ployees and Rest. Employees, Local 8 v. Jensen, 754 P.2d 1277, 1285 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
69. United States v. Overton, 470 F.2d 761, 765 (2d Cir. 1972).
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Despite the emphasis on defining the role of employer, an em-
ployer/employee relationship is not necessary for a conviction under
Section 186.70 In United States v. Ferrara,71 union officials representing
Walgreens’ staff used their influence to coerce members to give up
privileges in the collective bargaining agreement in exchange for a
promise that Walgreens would buy its coffee from Wechsler Coffee, a
company giving kickbacks to the union.72 The court held that Section
186 applied, despite the fact that the Wechsler Coffee did not employ
union members.73
In United States v. Overton,74 two brothers were representatives of
the union and had significant roles in the formation and operation of
a private stock company, Coordinated Community Services, Inc.
(“CCS”). Three of the four shareholders of CCS had ties to Associated
Grocers of Harlem, which in turn had ties to the union the Overton
Brothers represented. Shortly after CCS’s formation, Overton trans-
ferred his ownership of the company to another corporation, which
was owned by his brother. CCS contracted with food manufactures
and then solicited payments from them to guarantee that its products
would be placed in Harlem Grocery Stores. It was clear at trial that
CCS conferred a thing of value upon members of Overton’s Union
who represented store clerks.75 In fighting the Section 186 claim, two
of the CCS stockholders, who were also employers, argued that CCS, a
non-employer, was the entity that conferred the “thing of value” and
not the individual two stockholders. The Second Circuit held that
“[p]ayments by these employers, though made through a non-em-
ployer corporate instrumentality, are nevertheless within the prohibi-
tion of the statute.”76
70. United States v. Ferrara, 458 F.2d 868, 872–73 (2d Cir. 1972).
71. 458 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1972).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 873; see also Wabash Publ’g Co. v. Dermer, 650 F.Supp. 212, 215–16 (N.D. Ill.
1986) (finding that payments to union workers at a race track made by the printing com-
pany that printed track betting tip sheets and was in competition with other publishers
violated Section 186, despite the fact that the shop stewards who received the payments
were not employees of the printing company. The court held that, “if all other prerequi-
sites under 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(4) can be met, the fact that the union employees who the
stewards are accused of attempting to influence were not employees of the plaintiff does
not bar a claim for violation of that subsection.”).
74. 470 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1972).
75. Id. at 766.
76. Id. at 765; see also Haley v. Palatnik, 509 F.2d 1038, 1041 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding
that “[t]here is nothing to require that, in order to constitute a violation of § [186](a) and
(b) the moneys agreed to be paid to the union representative or official be paid from the
employer’s funds”).
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In United States v. Burge,77 the defendant was a business agent for a
union representing air freight workers in the midst of a turf war with a
rival union. The defendant promised an employer that he would keep
wages down, allow the employer to continue his health and welfare
plan, and guarantee the employer other benefits, if the employer
hired the defendant’s consulting firm as an independent contractor.
The defendant argued at trial that he was an employee of the em-
ployer being paid for services rendered, and thus fell within the ex-
ception created by Section 186(c)(1). The Sixth Circuit held the
conviction was proper despite the defendant’s independent contrac-
tor status, because the payments were intended to influence him in
his status as a union representative and not for his work done as an
independent contractor.78 Therefore, union officials and employees
must be careful in establishing any business relationship with an em-
ployer, even if those employees are not unionized, have no intention
of unionizing, have no relationship to their union, or are employers
under the subchapter and any relationship between them that in-
volves a “thing of value” can be scrutinized under Section 186.79
The Second Circuit looked beyond contracted language to find
an employer status when enjoining a musicians’ union from collecting
taxes from a bandleader.80 In Cutler v. American Federation of Musi-
cians,81 the court upheld an injunction prohibiting the union from
collecting a flat-fee tax from bandleaders who were also union mem-
bers. The court determined that the band leader was an employer for
the purposes of Section 186, despite the existence of a form contract,
which explicitly stated the purchaser of the band’s services—and not
the band leader—was the employer. The court pointed out that the
band leader “has all effective control of the orchestra.”82 He “hires the
sidemen, decides how much is to be charged for the performance and
what share is to be allocated to each sideman, subject of course to
union minimum charges. He also pays all the expenses of each per-
formance, workmen’s compensation, insurance premiums, withhold-
ing taxes and other taxes.”83
77. 990 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1992).
78. Id. at 249.
79. Wabash Publ’g Co. v. Dermer, 650 F. Supp. 212, 215–16 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
80. Cutler v. Am. Fed’n of Musicians, 316 F.2d 546, 548 (2d Cir. 1963).
81. Id. at 546.
82. Id. at 548.
83. Id.
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A. Agent of an Employer
The scope of who constitutes an employer is further expanded by
the use of the term, “any person acting as an agent of an employer,
directly or indirectly. . . .”84 “In determining whether any person is
acting as an ‘agent’ of another person so as to make such other per-
son responsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts
performed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified [is]
not . . . controlling.”85 Courts have held the terms employer and em-
ployee are not mutually exclusive.86 One must look to the situation
surrounding the need to define a person as an employer or employee,
as well as in what capacity that person is acting, in order to define
whether the person is acting as an agent of an employer. In light of
the liberal construction of how agency principles have been applied to
anti-union behavior surrounding other statutory sections, there is no
reason to believe that a similarly liberal view would not be the lens by
which employers agents are judged.87
B. Unions and Union Trust Funds
A union can qualify as an employer under Section 186. Under 29
U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006), a labor organization, other than when acting
as an employer, is exempt from the definition of “employer.”88 The
qualification of “other than when acting as an employer” applies to
84. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006).
85. 29 U.S.C. § 152(13) (2006); see also Bennion v. NLRB, 764 F.2d 739, 743 (10th Cir.
1985); NLRB. v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 728 F.2d 80,
86 (2d Cir. 1984) (standing for the proposition that the absence of actual authorization or
subsequent ratification is not controlling on the question of agency in connection with a
union or employer, and authority to act may be implied or apparent).
86. A foreman, in his relation to his employer, is an “employee” within this sub-
chapter, and, in his relation to the laborers under him, is a representative of his employer;
therefore, he is an “employer” under this subchapter. See NLRB v. Skinner & Kennedy
Stationery Co., 113 F.2d 667, 671 (8th Cir. 1940); NLRB v. Armour & Co., 154 F.2d 570,
575 (10th Cir. 1946).
87. Vista Verde Farms v. Agric. Labor Relations Bd., 158 Cal. Rptr. 20, 24 (Ct. App.
1979) (“‘In determining responsibility for anti-union activities, principles of agency and its
establishment are to be construed liberally.’ The determination of whether a third party’s
acts were [a]ctually authorized or subsequently ratified by the employer is not necessarily
conclusive on the question of agency. Rather, the court must determine, upon looking at
the record as a whole, whether the activities in question would create an impression of
agency among the affected employees.” (quoting NLRB v. Ark.-La. Gas Co., 333 F.2d 790,
795 (8th Cir. 1964) (citing NLRB v. Mayer, 196 F.2d 286, 288 (5th Cir. 1952)))), rev’d, 625
P.2d 263 (Cal. 1981).
88. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006).
\\server05\productn\S\SAN\44-1\SAN103.txt unknown Seq: 16 13-OCT-09 13:29
78 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
unions even though they are engaged in a non-profit business.89 The
label of employer also extends to union welfare trusts with
employees.90
C. Non-Profit Employers
Section 186 does not protect non-profit associations with an ex-
ception. However, after the 1974 amendments to Section 186, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) asserted jurisdiction over non-
profit organizations and removed the threat of criminal penalities.91
The most significant example of this can be found in NLRB v. Holtville
Ice & Cold Storage Co.92 In that case, the court deemed a non-profit
association composed of farmers and others “employers” because “the
association’s secretary-manager determined which persons the mem-
ber-employer should hire as employees.”93
VI. Representative of Employees
Section 186(a) prohibits an employer from making payments to
four broad categories of individuals:
(1) to any representative of any of his employees who are em-
ployed in an industry affecting commerce; or
(2) to any labor organization, or any officer or employee thereof,
which represents, seeks to represent, or would admit to mem-
bership, any of the employees of such employer who are em-
ployed in an industry affecting commerce; or
(3) to any employee or group or committee of employees of such
employer employed in an industry affecting commerce in ex-
cess of their normal compensation for the purpose of causing
such employee or group or committee directly or indirectly to
influence any other employees in the exercise of the right to
organize and bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing; or
(4) to any officer or employee of a labor organization engaged in
an industry affecting commerce with intent to influence him in
respect to any of his actions, decisions, or duties as a represen-
tative of employees or as such officer or employee of such la-
bor organization.94
89. Office Employees Int’l Union, Local No. 11 v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313, 313–15
(1957).
90. Blassie v. Kroger Co., 345 F.2d 58, 71–72 (8th Cir. 1965).
91. NLRB v. Holtville Ice & Cold Storage Co., 148 F.2d 168 (9th Cir. 1945).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 170.
94. 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
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While violations could be charged in multiple categories at once, each
category must be dealt with separately in order to fully comprehend
Section 186.
A. Representative of Any of the Employer’s Employees
Section 186(a)(1) prohibits an employer from making payments
to any representative of any of its employees who are employed in an
industry affecting commerce.95 The term “representative” “includes
any individual or labor organization.”96 The term “labor organization”
includes the following:
[A]ny organization of any kind, or any agency or employee repre-
sentation committee or plan, in which employees participate and
which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with
employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of
pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.97
Brennan v. United States98 is illustrative. In that case, the Eighth
Circuit upheld a district court’s jury instruction that found a person
authorized to act does not necessarily have to exercise any of the pow-
ers conferred upon him. The court held:
Representative as used in this Act may also include one who is em-
powered, authorized or designated by any employee or employees
to represent any employee or employees in any negotiation with
their employer for the establishment of a new union and its recog-
nition by such employer as a representative of said employees in
any matter relating to their wages, hours, or working conditions.99
The court further defined the term by stating:
Any labor organization, such as a local union, union council, union
conference or international union which is empowered, author-
ized or designated by any employee or employees to act on his or
their behalf in any dealing with the employer with respect to hours,
wages or working conditions is by virtue thereof a representative of
such employee or employees, and any individual who actively holds
and occupies an office or position of responsibility in any such
union local, council, conference, or international, who is empow-
ered or authorized in such office or position to act for any such
labor organization in which he holds office in such way as to affect
any such employee in a substantial way in any dealing with the em-
ployee’s employer with respect to hours of labor, wages or working
95. Id. § 186(a)(1).
96. Id. § 152(4).
97. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5).
98. 240 F.2d 253, 264 (8th Cir. 1957).
99. Id.
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conditions, is thereby also a representative of such employee or
employees.100
Therefore, Section 186 covers any representatives, including
those who only represent a minority of the employees.101 An employer
need not have knowledge of the exact representation when the pay-
ment is made.102 In Korholz v. United States,103 the employer was una-
ware of how many employees the union leader represented. The
employer only knew the union leader was attempting to organize the
employer’s labor through secret ballot. The Tenth Circuit held there
was sufficient evidence to show the employer made payments because
it believed the union represented its employees.104
In assessing whether an individual qualifies as a representative,
the individual’s title and employment status have little relevancy. The
duties of an individual are strong evidence in establishing representa-
tion, but are not necessarily required.105 These duties include repre-
senting the union in any jurisdictional problem occurring on the job,
investigating grievances, ensuring that job conditions are safe, check-
ing in the employees in the morning and checking the employees out
at night, ensuring that union dues are paid by checking union cards,
and generally looking out for the union members’ welfare.106
The more important question is the function that the alleged rep-
resentative plays. For example in Sheet Metal Contractors Ass’n v. Sheet
Metal Workers International Ass’n,107 the plaintiff, an employers’ associa-
tion, brought suit against a union that did not directly represent any
of its employees. However, the defendant union did represent sheet
metal workers in locations that plaintiff’s employees were sometimes
contracted to work. The lawsuit arose from an agreement to establish
a joint industry board that would require the plaintiff to pay whenever
its employees were contracted to work in locations covered by the de-
fendant’s union. This would maintain the base rate the defendant
100. Id.
101. United States v. Pecora, 267 F.2d 512, 515 (3d Cir. 1959).
102. Korholz v. United States, 269 F.2d 897 (10th Cir. 1959).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 902.
105. Mech. Contractors Ass’n v. Local Union 420, 265 F.2d 607, 611 (3d Cir. 1959)
(finding that persons designated by a union to administer a fund derived from employer
contributions were representatives within the meaning of Section 186, even where none of
the fund’s purposes included collective bargaining for the employees, representation on
the job, or addressing grievances); Sheet Metal Contractors Ass’n v. Sheet Metal Workers
Int’l Union, 248 F.2d 307, 315–16 (9th Cir. 1957).
106. United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855, 862 (7th Cir. 1977) (finding that a part-time
business agent was a representative).
107. 248 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1957).
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union had bargained for in the area. Plaintiff brought suit seeking a
declaratory judgment that the payments would violate Section 186.
The defendant union argued it was an outside union, not a represen-
tative of the employer’s employees, and therefore the trust would not
violate Section 186. In finding that the union was a representative of
the employer’s employees, the Ninth Circuit looked past the fact the
employer and the union would share representation on the board,
and instead focused on the function of the defendant union. Specifi-
cally, the court found that even though one purpose of the joint in-
dustry board was to protect the defendant union’s members, the
board also assisted sheet metal workers who were employees of the
plaintiff, and thus qualified as a representative of the employer’s em-
ployees under Section 186(a)(1).108
Arguably, an individual cannot represent employees unless his
representation was in some way authorized or subsequently ratified.109
Yet, this argument has been heavily discredited by those amendments
to Section 186 that sought to stem employers’ attempts at bribery of
union officials in an effort to block unionization of their present em-
ployees.110 Therefore, a payment to a representative that did not cur-
rently represent employees could be in violation of Section 186(a)(2).
B. A Labor Organization “Would Admit to Membership”
Section 186(a)(2) states that payments by an employer to “any
labor organization, or any officer or employee thereof, which repre-
sents, seeks to represent, or would admit to membership, any of the
employees of such employer who are employed in an industry affect-
ing commerce.”111 A string of cases have sought to clarify the term
“would admit to membership,” as the language gives little guidance as
to its limits.
In United States v. Sink,112 the employer was a cleaning business
actively seeking to expand into the Philadelphia area. Sink was the
president of a Philadelphia-based union that represented janitors and
cleaning persons. Sink accepted payment in the form of a hotel room
from the corporate employer. There was no question that, at the time
of the payment, the union did not represent any of the employer’s
108. Id. at 314–15; see also Mech. Contractors Ass’n., 265 F.2d at 607.
109. Ventimiglia v. United States, 242 F.2d 620 (4th Cir. 1957).
110. United States v. Cody, 722 F.2d 1052, 1058–59 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing S. Rep. No.
86-187 (1959), reprinted in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2318, 2329–30).
111. 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(2) (2006).
112. 355 F. Supp. 1067 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff’d mem., 485 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1973).
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current employees, as there were none in Philadelphia. However, in
finding Sink guilty, the trial court implied through its jury instructions
that a “present intent” to admit the corporation’s employees was re-
quired.113 The Third Circuit upheld the reasoning and the present-
intent requirement employed by the trial court in assessing the term
“would admit to membership.”114
Similarly, in United States v. Cody,115 the employer/contractor al-
lowed a local union official to use a luxury apartment for free. The
Second Circuit found no impropriety because the employer did not
employ laborers represented by the union. The court rejected the ar-
gument that the “would admit to membership” language included any
employer who would have employed union members in the future. Yet,
the court admitted “there may be circumstances in which the possible
future hiring of unionized workers might lead to abuses that  § 186
was designed to prevent.”116 The Second Circuit went on to differenti-
ate the present case from Sink, stating that “[i]n Sink, there was no
doubt that the employer was actively planning expansion into Phila-
delphia, where its present employees would have been admitted to the
local union.”117 Further, the court found “that the gift from the em-
ployer to the Philadelphia union representative was made at the time
this expansion was being contemplated.”118 Unlike in Sink, the rela-
tionship between the construction company as an employer and Cody
as a union officer “was too nebulous at the time the gift was made to
be the basis for a criminal charge.”119
In United States v. Pecora,120 the Third Circuit was confronted with
three arguments as to why the term “would be admitted to member-
ship” could not apply to payments from an employer to a union repre-
113. The court crafted a jury instruction which read:
When we say “would admit to membership,” that does not mean some indefinite,
uncertain future, vague possibility. It means at the time the acts were performed
and done that as of that time there was either a present intention for the employ-
ees of MacClean Service Company to apply for membership or that there was a
present intention for MacClean Service Company to obtain work in the Philadel-
phia area and to employ employees that would and could be admitted to mem-
bership in Local No. 69.
Id. at 1071.
114. Id.
115. 722 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1983).
116. Id. at 1059.
117. Id. (citing U.S. v. Sink, 355 F. Supp. 1067 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff’d mem., 485 F.2d 683
(3d Cir. 1973)).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 798 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1986).
\\server05\productn\S\SAN\44-1\SAN103.txt unknown Seq: 21 13-OCT-09 13:29
Summer 2009] CLARIFYING THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT 83
sentative. First, the union that received payments could not represent
the employer’s workers because jurisdiction had been awarded to an-
other local of the same international.121 Second, the employer’s em-
ployees were already covered by a collective bargaining agreement
with another union and therefore any interference would be barred
by the NLRB’s contract bar rule.122 Third, Section 186(a) required a
present intent to organize the employer’s employees to
membership.123
In rejecting all three arguments, the Third Circuit wrote “[w]e
are unwilling to hold that, where an employer pays off a union to keep
it from attempting to represent its workers, the existence of possible
roadblocks to the actual accomplishment of the union’s ‘threat’ will
conclusively render section [186](a)(2) inapplicable.”124 The court
recognized that if there was an actual impossibility as a matter of law,
such an event may block the application of Section 186(a)(2).125 Fur-
ther, the court found that a present intent was not required to prove a
violation under Section 186(a)(2). Specifically, the court found:
To hold that section [186](a)(2) requires a present intention
rather than a potential to attempt to organize a group of employ-
ees would allow employers to evade the operation of section [186]
by timing their payoffs in such a way that they were paid at times
when a union local could not assert its right, and would require an
inquiry into the subjective intentions of employees, employers, and
union officials.126
Lastly, the Third Circuit distanced itself from its previous decision in
Sink, holding any implied present-intent requirement gleaned from
that case was moot since the court only held the jury instruction was
not prejudicial to the plaintiff.127
The most current reading of the language “would admit to mem-
bership” is from United States v. Browne.128 In Browne, the plaintiffs were
a brother/sister team who were a high-ranking union official and a
union administrative assistant respectively. One of the defendants had
accepted payments from numerous employers, none of which em-
ployed anyone in the union Browne represented at the time the pay-
ments were made. Browne relied heavily on the language of Cody in
121. Id. at 621.
122. Id. at 619.
123. Id. at 625.
124. Id. at 623.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 624.
128. 505 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2007).
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asserting that there must be an existing relationship between the em-
ployer and members of the union.129 In grappling with the language
of Section 186(a)(2), the Eleventh Circuit went beyond the Cody court
to acknowledge a possible criminal violation only when employers at-
tempt to block unionization of their present employees through brib-
ery of union officials.130
The Browne court also rejected any notion of a present intent re-
quirement, instead stating that the “relevant consideration in applying
§ 186(a)(2)’s ‘would admit to membership’ clause is whether the
union would admit any of the employees who were currently working
for the employer at the time the subject payment was made.”131 The
court acknowledged its holding would limit the government’s ability
to prosecute violations where there is only a possible future employ-
ment relationship between a potential employer and individuals who
would be admitted to membership in the union. The court also noted
that “[o]ur holding here rules out the possibility that the statute could
impose criminal liability on either a union official who receives a pay-
ment, or a potential employer who makes one, while the would-be
employer has no employees at the time who would be admitted.”132
The Browne decision limits the scope of Section 186(a)(2) by shack-
ling the statute to the present circumstances at the time the alleged
unlawful payments are made. Based on Browne, the government can-
not prophesize a future relationship in order to criminally prosecute.
C. Payment in Excess of Normal Compensation
Section 186(a)(3) prohibits payments by an employer under the
following circumstances:
[T]o any employee or group or committee of employees of such
employer employed in an industry affecting commerce in excess of
their normal compensation for the purpose of causing such em-
ployee or group or committee directly or indirectly to influence
any other employees in the exercise of the right to organize and
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing
. . . .133
There is a void of case law that corresponds to Section 186(a)(3).
The most likely reason for such scarcity of precedent is that logically
almost every situation that would give rise to a possible Section
129. Id. at 1250.
130. Id. at 1251.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1252 n.18.
133. 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(3) (2006).
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186(a)(3) violation would also give rise to an unfair labor practice
charge under the National Labor Relations Act (“NRLA”) and argua-
bly be preempted. However, there is some conflict between circuits as
to whether Section 186 would be subject to preemption under the
primary jurisdiction doctrine explained below.
In Local 355 Hotel, Motel, Restaurant & Hi-Rise Employees and Bar-
tenders Union v. Pier 66 Co.,134 the union brought a Section 186(a)(3)
claim based on allegations that the employer had offered wage in-
creases, promotions, and free schooling to induce employees into fil-
ing for decertification of the union with the NLRB. The employer
argued that the union was attempting to circumvent the exclusive ju-
risdiction of the NLRB by bringing what were actually unfair labor
practice charges in federal court disguised as criminal violations. The
court, citing language in the Supreme Court’s decision in San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon,135 agreed with the employer by find-
ing that the NLRB had primary jurisdiction in deciding what consti-
tuted an unfair labor practice. Additionally, federal courts do not have
jurisdiction over activity that is arguably subject to sections 7 or 8 of
the NLRA. As such, the court must defer to the exclusive competence
of the NLRB when faced with matters of this kind.136
The NLRB’s primary jurisdiction applies in the following
circumstances:
[W]here a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes
into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolu-
tion of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed
within the special competence of an administrative body; in such a
case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such is-
sues to the administrative body for its views.137
While there is no precedent applying the doctrine of primary jurisdic-
tion to Section 186(a)(3) specifically, the theory has been applied nu-
merous times to collective bargaining issues giving rise to Section 186
claims.138
134. 599 F. Supp. 761 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
135. Id. at 764 (citing San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236
(1959)).
136. Id.; see also United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 400 v. Marval Poultry
Co., No. 84-0126-H, 1986 WL 25434 (W.D. Va. July 10, 1986).
137. Am. Commercial Barge Lines Co., v. Seafarers Int’l Union of N. Am., 730 F.2d
327, 338 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59 (1956)).
138. See id. at 327; Cent. Fla. Sheet Metal Contractors Ass’n v. NLRB, 664 F.2d 489 (5th
Cir. 1981); Mobile Mech. Contractors Ass’n v. Carlough, 664 F.2d 481, 487, 488 n.10 (5th
Cir. 1981).
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The Sixth Circuit has approached the applicability of the primary
jurisdiction doctrine in a much more critical light.139 In Hospital Em-
ployee’s Division of Local 79, Service Employees International Union v. Mercy-
Memorial Hospital Corp.,140 the Sixth Circuit noted that the primary ju-
risdiction doctrine was established to ensure uniformity under the
NLRA, but was not designed to preempt other independent liability-
creating statutes. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that while Section 186
and sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA prohibit similar activities, they pro-
vide different independent remedies. Additionally, if the primary ju-
risdiction doctrine were valid in the Section 186 context, it would
effectively void Section 186 claims, because potentially every Section
186 claim would also constitute an unfair labor practice under sec-
tions 7 or 8 of the NLRA.141 Because there is conflicting case law, this
branch of Section 186 should continue to be monitored; the applica-
tion of the primary jurisdiction doctrine has major implications in re-
gards to the practical use of Section 186 as a combative tool against
employers.
D. Payment with the Intent to Influence
Section 186(a)(4) prohibits payments by employers to “any of-
ficer or employee of a labor organization engaged in an industry af-
fecting commerce with intent to influence him in respect to any of his
actions, decisions, or duties as a representative of employees or as
such officer or employee of such labor organization.”142 An officer is
defined as “any constitutional officer, any person authorized to per-
form the functions of president, vice president, secretary, treasurer, or
other executive functions of a labor organization, and any member of
its executive board or similar governing body.”143 Courts have been
unwilling to define the term “officer,” and arguments aimed at exam-
ining the scope of an officer’s duties have been futile. In fact, “Con-
gress in 1959 foreclosed this argument when it passed Section 186 to
cover ‘any officer or employee’ of a labor organization.”144
139. Hosp. Employees’ Div. of Local 79, Serv. Employees Int’l Union v. Mercy-Memo-
rial Hosp. Corp., 862 F.2d 606 (6th Cir. 1988).
140. 862 F.2d 606 (6th Cir. 1988).
141. Id.; see also United Food and Commercial Workers Local 204 v. Harris-Teeter Su-
permarkets, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1551 (W.D.N.C. 1989) (applying the same argument to
ERISA).
142. 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(4) (2006).
143. 29 U.S.C. § 402(n) (2006).
144. United States v. Fisher, 387 F.2d 165, 168 (2d Cir. 1967) (holding that even a
person not formally an officer could fall within the broad definition of officer); see also
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There is little case law addressing the specific intent required
within Section 186(a)(4). In United States v. Ferrara,145 the Second Cir-
cuit noted that although there is no intent requirement for Section
186(a)(1), there is such a requirement for Section 186(a)(4).146 To
show the requisite intent for Section 186(a)(4), one must only show
the payments were intended to influence “any” of the officer’s or em-
ployee’s actions.147 Arguments to the effect that the intent must be to
influence the collective bargaining process have failed.148
VII. Thing of Value
Under Section 186, it is illegal for an employer to “pay, lend, or
deliver, or agree to pay, lend, or deliver, any money or other thing
of value”149 to those persons who would fall within Section
186(a)(1)–(4). Defining what constitutes a “thing of value” is a case-
by-case assessment.
In United States v. Roth,150 the court found that a loan constituted
a “thing of value,” and wrote “[v]alue is usually set by the desire to
have the ‘thing’ and depends upon the individual and the circum-
stances.”151 The Roth court went on to expound on “a thing of value”
and ended its opinion with the following caveat:
[I]t may be argued that a five-dollar Christmas tie is a ‘thing of
value’ and a Christmas present hopefully is to create good will in
the recipient towards the donor. Countless hypothetical cases can
be put, each on its facts approaching that evanescent borderline
between the proper and the improper. No calculating machine has
yet been invented to make these determinations with certainty. In
the meantime the courts must rely upon the less mechanical judg-
ment and common sense which under the present system is, and of
necessity must be, lodged in judges and juries.152
United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1977) (finding that a part-time business agent
constituted an officer).
145. 458 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1972).
146. Id. at 873 n.5 (“[T]his Court said that ‘[§ 186] makes such payments unlawful only
if they were intended to influence the actions of the recipient in relation to the union of
which he is an officer.’ While this statement is true with respect to § 186(a)(4), it is clear
from the statutory language that intent to influence is not a requisite element of
§ 186(a)(1).” (quoting United States v. McCarthy, 422 F.2d 160, 162 (2d Cir. 1970))); see
also United States v. Gigante, 982 F. Supp. 140 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
147. 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(4) (2006).
148. United States v. Pecora, 798 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1986).
149. 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) (2006).
150. 333 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1964).
151. Id. at 453.
152. Id. at 454.
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The following is an inventory of what has been—and what has
not been—deemed “a thing of value” under Section 186.
Held Not to Constitute a Thing of Value
• An employer’s list of employees’ names and addresses, even
when given to rival labor unions seeking to represent the
employees153
• Neutrality Agreements governing the recognition of labor
unions154
• Intangible benefit of continuing ability to influence corrupt
union practices155
• Payments to an orchestra leader by the local union because it
was a “work equivalent”156
• Payment made by the National Football League to the players’
union pursuant to a licensing litigation settlement157
• Payment by the employer of employee wages directly to a bank
where the wages were to be deposited into employee-created sav-
ings accounts158
• Employer’s payment to employee of wages for the time spent at-
tending a union grievance159
• Contributions by employer to a welfare fund where the official
later gained control of the fund and used it for his own
benefit160
• Concessions to an employer that allowed employees to attend
union presentations on paid time161
• Back-pay award ordered by the board to a victim of discrimina-
tion and accepted by the pension trust162
Held to Constitute a Thing of Value
• Power to direct payments to others163
153. Wyman-Gordon Co. v. NLRB, 397 F.2d 394 (1st Cir. 1968), rev’d on other grounds,
394 U.S. 759 (1969).
154. Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hospitality Res. LLC,
390 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Patterson v. Heartland Indus. Partners, LLP, 428 F.
Supp. 2d 714 (N.D. Ohio 2006).
155. United States v. Cervone, 907 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1990).
156. Zentner v. Am. Fed’n of Musicians, 343 F.2d 758 (2d Cir. 1965).
157. White v. Nat’l Football League, 836 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Minn. 1993).
158. Local Union No. 636 of United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am. v. Del.
Contractors Ass’n, 344 F. Supp 1281 (D. Del 1972).
159. Employers’ Indep. Union v. Wyman Gordan Co., 314 F. Supp. 458 (N.D. Ill.
1970).
160. Aroroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419 (1959).
161. Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, 550 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2008).
162. NLRB v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am. Local No. 1913, 531 F.2d
424 (9th Cir. 1976).
163. United States v. Carlock, 806 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1986).
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• Employer’s payment of lease and provision of a car to union offi-
cial for four months164
• Free monthly use of an automobile over three-month period165
• Gift of chauffeuring services provided to a business agent with-
out payment of fair market value166
• Payment of kickbacks to fund trustees from real estate commis-
sions earned when the fund purchased property167
• Construction services on a business agent’s residence provided
below the fair market price168
• Information with respect to one’s employees169
• Payment to union official by contractor-employer who often em-
ployed union members, but did not employ any union members
at the time the payments were made; the contractor-employer
relied on the continual source of employees provided by the hir-
ing hall as needed170
• Payments to a trust by an employer for the purpose of building
relations between employer and union member employees171
• Payments made to a union official as salaries of employees who
were never actually employed172
• Payments to a union official as benefits through the employer’s
established pension plan173
• Payments as commissions made by a restaurant coffee supplier to
union officials representing employees of a restaurant in ex-
change for the agreement that the employer would purchase the
supplier’s coffee174
• Payments to a union official’s third-party creditor by an em-
ployer to satisfy the union official’s debts175
• Payment of a $16,300 salary to a girlfriend of a union official for
unneeded bookkeeping services176
• Contributions by an employer to a dinner honoring a retiring
union official, and the surplus proceeds were distributed to the
union official in cash177
• Payment by corporate employer to transport company owned by
union official178
164. United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1982).
165. United States v. Sheeran, 699 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1983).
166. United States v. Cody, 722 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1983).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Zentner v. Am. Fed’n of Musicians, 237 F. Supp. 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
170. United States v. Gibas, 300 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1962).
171. Conditioned Air and Refrigeration Co. v. Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Labor-Mgmt.
Relations Trust, 159 F. Supp 887 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
172. United States v. Pecora, 798 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1986).
173. United States v. Phillips, 19 F.3d 1565 (11th Cir. 1994).
174. United States v. Ferrara, 458 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1972).
175. Korholz v. United States, 269 F.2d 897 (10th Cir. 1959).
176. United States v. Lanni, 466 F.2d 1102 (3d Cir. 1972).
177. Pecora, 798 F.2d at 614.
178. United States v. McMaster, 343 F.2d 176 (6th Cir. 1965).
\\server05\productn\S\SAN\44-1\SAN103.txt unknown Seq: 28 13-OCT-09 13:29
90 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
• Interest-free loans made to union officials  without a request for
collateral179
• Delivery of $900 in cash as an unrequested Christmas gift by an
employer to a union business representative180
• Lower interest rates on loans given to a union representative181
• Payment by an employer, at direction of a union official, to a
third party, despite a lack of evidence that the union official ac-
tually benefited182
• Free cruise tickets given to union officials by waterfront
employers183
• Payment of union president’s insurance premiums by an
employer184
• Payments made directly to International Longshoremen’s Associ-
ation to compensate the union for lost dues revenues as a conse-
quence of containerization185
• Delivery by employer to union official of free construction
materials186
• Below market price hotel rates at “union” hotels187
• Monthly payments of pension benefits to union negotiators in
exchange for concessions188
• Union official’s demand that an employer award a contract to a
company in which the union official had an interest, and that
the employer hire employees at the direction of the official189
• A union official’s order that an employer lease equipment from
a company owned by the union official’s former daughter-in-
law190
VIII. Guidance Through the Department of Labor
The majority of Section 186 cases involve egregious violations.
Whether the DOJ would bring charges based on gifts of lesser value
than those mentioned in this Article is debatable. However, its right to
do so is definite, as there is no de minimus exception within Section
186. The DOJ has not given any guidance as to what constitutes “a
thing of value.” However, the Department of Labor (“DOL”), through
its enforcement of the LM-10 form (employers) and LM-30 form
179. United States v. Roth, 333 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Borland, 309
F. Supp. 280 (D. Del. 1970).
180. United States v. Thompson, 466 F. Supp. 18 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
181. United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146 (1961).
182. United States v. DeBrouse, 652 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1981).
183. United States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289 (11th Cir. 1982).
184. United States v. Lippi, 190 F. Supp. 604 (D. Del. 1961).
185. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 326 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1964).
186. United States v. Fisher, 387 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1967).
187. United States v. Schiffman, 552 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1977).
188. Cox v. Adm’r U.S. Steel and Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386 (11th Cir. 1994).
189. United States v. DeBrouse, 652 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1981).
190. United States v. Carlock, 806 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1986).
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(union), has made it clear that even small gifts constitute “a thing of
value.” The LM-10 and LM-30 forms mandate that an employer/
union officer or employee must record and report any benefit with
monetary value which the DOL has clarified to mean “anything of
value, tangible or intangible.”191 This means meals, tickets, donations,
green fees, holiday presents, and anything of value with few excep-
tions.192 The DOL offered a list of examples it considered reportable
payments by an employer for LM-10/LM-30 purposes:
• A vendor of office supplies to a union guarantees payment of a
bank loan made to a representative of that union
• A vendor of printing and publishing services to a union sends a
holiday gift basket worth more than $250 to the union’s
treasurer
• An employer of the union members provides the union’s officers
an exclusive opportunity to purchase the employer’s stock at be-
low market prices
• A vendor of legal or accounting services to a union takes the
union’s officers on a golf excursion
• A vendor whose business consists in substantial part of selling
restaurant equipment to the employer of the union members
makes loans to the union’s officers
• A vendor of financial services to a union affiliated pension plan
provides a gift worth more than $250 to a union trustee
• An employer of the union members pays a union official for a
“no-show” job
• An employer of the union members takes a union official, with
whom it is negotiating a collective bargaining agreement out for
dinner and drinks worth more than $250
• An employer pays any of its employees to persuade other em-
ployees not to join a union or to affect the negotiation of a col-
lective bargaining contract
• An employer makes expenditures for the printing and dissemi-
nation of pamphlets, advertisements, or other printed matter
that threatens to move or close the plant if organized
• An employer gives gifts or provides services to employees on the
condition that they would not organize
• An employer pays a labor relations consultant to deliver an anti-
union speech to its employees
191. Office of Labor-Mgmt. Standards, U.S. Dep’t of Labor Employment Standards Ad-
min., LM-30 Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.dol.gov/esa/olms/regs/compli-
ance/RevisedLM30_FAQ.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2009).
192. There is an exception to LM-30 reporting if the item given is unrelated to the
officer or employee’s status. However to fall within the LM-30 de minimus exception, the
amount or value of the item must be less than $250, be sporadic or occasional and unre-
lated to the business of the union. Office of Labor-Mgmt. Standards, U.S. Dep’t of Labor
Employment Standards Admin., Form LM-10 Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.
dol.gov/esa/olms/regs/compliance/LM10_FAQ.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2009).
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• An employer pays a labor relations consultant to plant agents
among its employees to obtain reports about a union’s organiza-
tional activities193
Payments to a charity independent of the union are exempt from
the reporting requirements of the LM-10/30. For example, a dona-
tion to the United Way is non-reportable as it is independent of the
union. Similarly, a donation to the United Way would not fall within
the confines of Section 186 because it would not fall within subsec-
tions (a) or (b). The more delicate situation is one in which an em-
ployer makes a donation to a union apprenticeship fund or union
relief fund or scholarship. These donations should be non-reportable
for the LM-30 and legal under Section 186—they would fall within the
exceptions of Section 186(c). However, the fund must conform to the
requirements of Section 186(c)(5). The more independence such
fund has from the union can only help ensure its legality. Further, the
donations should be made directly to the fund and not filter through
the union or official. For example, if checks for a charity golf tourna-
ment were made to the union with proceeds going to an independent
charity, it could be classified as a prohibited transaction under Section
186 despite even the best intentions.
The most important aspect of the LM-10/30 reporting forms is
that everything reported on both is potentially—and more than
likely—a technical violation of Section 186. While it is unclear as to
whether the DOL will assist the DOJ by sharing the content of such
reports, the DOL has made it clear that the purpose of the reports is
to make public any actual or potential conflict between the personal
financial interests of a labor organization officer or employee and his
or her obligations to the labor organization and its members.194
Therefore, it is in the best interest of union officials and members to
refrain from receiving any gift or benefit that would potentially need
to be reported on the LM-30 form, as doing so would effectively be
documenting and handing evidence of a  violation to the DOL.
Conclusion
This Article provides insight into the scope and flexibility of Sec-
tion 186. The statute places absolute prohibitions on the transactions
described in this Article, while requiring little criminal intent. How-
193. Id.
194. Office of Labor-Mgmt. Standards, U.S. Dep’t of Labor Employment Standards Ad-
min., Fact Sheet LM-30, http://www.dol.gov/esa/olms/regs/compliance/RevisedLM30
factsheet.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2009).
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ever, the purpose of Section 186 is prevention, and courts have been
willing to broadly read and apply its rules and penalties. The criminal
penalty for a violation of Section 186 in which the “thing of value”
exceeds $1000 is imprisonment for five years and a fine for each viola-
tion. For transactions in which the “thing of value” is $1000 or less, the
penalty is imprisonment for one year and a fine.195 While many gifts
are designed to foster goodwill within management/labor relations,
such activities must be reconsidered. The above analysis only high-
lights those situations in which certain transactions are prohibited and
further emphasizes that a better course of action would be to cease all
acceptances of gifts, payments, or anything of value from employers.
Through strict adherence to a general no gift policy, union officials
and membership can eliminate any guesswork involving managing the
application of Section 186. While gifts can legitimately have beneficial
goodwill affects, any such benefit is outweighed by the criminal con-
duct that could result. Therefore, to best ensure that no violation of
Section 186 occurs, unions and their membership should strive to
maintain independence from employers by ceasing all acceptances of
gifts or anything of value.
195. 29 U.S.C. § 186(d) (2006).
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